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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
supreme Court lias original jurisdiction over appeals of decisions
from District Courts in the State "'

mi | MM

V

f i i \\ \\ i • »ih m
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3-102 and 78A-4-103, an appeal may be transferred by the Utah Supreme Court
to the Utah Court of Appeals for decision, as was done in this case.
SiAlEMENTOF ISSUES
Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309(1) states tho

e

commission in which an attorney is employed, the commission has full power to
reiiuhli' .mil li

IIi' l e ^ '.'I Hit; JIIIIIIU-"

le issue on appeal is whether this

statutory provision applies <nils/ In • illumes/'1, Ice,', i ,il(,dialed ii|mii vviukeis'
compensation benefits awarded to the petitioner, as appellant argues (see Utah
Allium \.'.ode K602-2-4): or, whether this statutory provision comprehends any
and all attorney's fpp« in m w.iy icLiicil | ,i ;, nktr

i ompensation litigation,

as appellee argues and the trial court found.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standrinl id ics/KM/w r, ,i ijucoiioii id l.iw which the court may review for
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (\
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The

mc =^rp applicable to this Court's review of

the issues on appeal:
A.
"pursua

Code R602-2-4, Attorney Fees. This ml--- states IIml
Jode Ann. §34A-1-309, the Commission adopts the following
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rule to regulate and fix reasonable fees for attorneys representing applicants in
workers' compensation or occupational illness claims." (Emphasis added.);
B.

Utah Code Ann. §26-19-7, Medical Benefits Recovery Act. See

particularly §26-19-7(2)(c)(ii) regarding collection agreements.
C.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309, Attorney Fees. This statute states that

"in a case before the commission in which an attorney is employed, the
commission has full power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney."
D.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106, Injuries or Death Caused by [Third

Parties].
E.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-207, Noncompliance—Civil Action by

Employees.
F.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-212, Docketing Awards in District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case. The trial court gives an accurate, brief

background of the case, which is essentially repeated here. Employee, Alvaro
Diaz, suffered ankle and knee injuries while working for Beehive Telephone. He
received treatment for his injuries and related complications of hemophelia at,
among other medical care providers, the University of Utah Hospital (the
"Hospital.") The cost of the treatment "totaled in excess of $550,000.00."
Complaint, fl5 (brackets omitted); see also Amended Answer, j[5. The medical
care Mr. Diaz received from all medical providers (including the Hospital) totaled
in excess of $2.6 million.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Mr. Diaz sought disability compensation and medical benefits for his
injuries in an action before the Utah Labor Commission styled Alvaro Diaz v.
Beehive Telephone and/or Workers' Compensation Fund, Case No. 08-0020.
Davis & Sanchez (the "Law Firm") represented him in this action. The Law Firm
also sought, but did not receive, consent to represent the Hospital's interests in
the action before the labor commission.
The parties in the workers' compensation action, through mediation, were
able to come to a compromise. As part of the compromise, the Workers'
Compensation Fund, on behalf of Beehive Telephone, agreed to reimburse the
medical care providers for certain medical expenses incurred in treating Mr. Diaz.
More specifically, the Law Firm alleges that "[a]s a direct result of [its] efforts in
mediation, the [Hospital] has been paid to date approximately $347,000.00 by the
[Workers' Compensation Fund] for Mr. Diaz's medical bills." Complaint, f7; see
also Amended Answer, 1J7.
Based on this recovery, the Law Firm seeks from the Hospital "[pjayment
of a 33% attorney's fee, or $114,551.00 on [the] approximately $347,000.00
already collected on behalf of [the Hospital] due to [the Law Firm's] efforts."
Complaint, p. 3. The theory behind the Complaint is that the Law Firm is entitled
to attorney fees under the "common fund" doctrine in order to prevent the
Hospital's unjust enrichment. See Complaint, ^[2.
(As an update, since filing its Complaint against the Hospital, the Law Firm
has recovered in a second workers' compensation litigation and subsequent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mediation, approximately $209,000.00 more for the Hospital that the Workers'
Compensation Fund refused or neglected to pay under the original settlement
agreement entered into following the first litigation and mediation of the same
case.)
B.

Course of Proceedings. In its hearing to rule on plaintiff's and

defendant's competing motions for summary judgment, the Third District Court
entertained three independent reasons for summary adjudication put forth by the
Hospital. First, the Hospital argued that it is immune from suit under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-101, et seq. Second, the
Hospital argued that the Law Firm "has not pled sufficient facts to invoke the
common fund doctrine." Defs mem. re judgment on the pleadings, p. 5
(capitalization omitted). And third, the Hospital argued that "the Labor
Commission has been delegated the exclusive authority by the legislature to
award attorney's fees in worker's [sic] compensation cases." Id., p. 6
(capitalization omitted).
C.

Disposition at Trial Court. The trial court found that the third

argument, which is essentially an argument that the District Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, was dispositive. Judge Himonas, therefore, declined to
address the governmental immunity and common fund arguments at all, except
to opine in passing that courts have long recognized a common law exception to
governmental immunity for equitable claims, which the Law Firm's claim is.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The crux of Judge Himonas' ruling is that "the Labor Commission plainly
has the authority and jurisdiction to address all attorney fee issues: 'In a case
before the comission in which an attorney is employed, the comission has full
power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney.' Utah Code Ann. §34A-1309(1) (emphasis in original). This sweeping language is not limited, as the Law
Firm argues, to fees paid by the injured party. Rather, the provision comprehends
all of the fees related to the workers' compensation litigation." Judge Himonas'
Memorandum Decision dated January 10, 2011, pp. 5-6. (Emphasis added.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §34A-1 -309(1) is far too
broad. The statute reads: "[l]n a case before the commission in which an attorney
is employed, the commission has full power to regulate and fix the fees of the
attorney." Were this statute to be applied in the sweeping manner Appellee and
the trial court argue it should be, then any attorney employed in any case before
the labor commission—or employed in any case in civil court based upon the
same accident or injury—must be paid attorney's fees in accordance with labor
commission rules. This is not the case in practice.
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court quotes Stokes v. Flanders, 970
P.2d 1260 (Utah 1998), as follows: "On its face, this provision gave the
Commission broad authority to 'regulate' and 'fix' attorneys fees. . .
Consequently, because the Commission has the power and jurisdiction to fix the
Law Firm's fee, this court lacks jurisdiction. See Id., at 1265. ('[T]he Commission
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of attorney fees charged in
cases brought before it, whether the case was successful or not.'); see also
Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 773 ('District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over
cases that fall within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act.') (Citations
omitted.)" Judge Himonas' Memorandum Decision dated January 10, 2011, p. 6.
What the trial court fails to cite from the Stokes case is the following
language: "The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled that the Commission's power to
fix attorney's fees 'applies only to the fixing of fees of an attorney out of any
award made to his client and does not authorize the Industrial Commission to
assess attorney's fees as costs against either party.' Stokes, quoting Graham v.
Industrial Commission, 27 Utah 2d 279, 495 P.2d 806 (Utah 1972)." (Emphasis
added.)
Finally, the Supreme Court in Olympus Oil, Inc. v. Harrison, 778, P.2d
1008 (Utah App. 1989) held "that the Commission is not statutorily authorized to
make awards of attorney's fees in addition to awards of compensation benefits."
(Emphasis added.) Put another way, the commission has no business making
awards in civil court cases.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Attorney's Fees of Workers' Compensation Defense Attorneys

are Not Regulated or Fixed by the Commission.
Insurance company defense attorneys who practice before the labor
commission do not have their attorney's fees regulated or fixed by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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commission. Neither are disputes between workers' compensation insurance
company defense attorneys and their insurance company clients regarding
attorney's fees regulated or fixed by the commission. Utah Admin. Code R602-24 plainly states that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 authorizing the
commission to regulate and fix reasonable fees for attorneys, that its purpose is
"to regulate and fix reasonable fees for attorneys representing applicants in
workers' compensation or occupational illness claims." (Emphasis added.)
B.

In Cases Where a Workers' Compensation Claim Gives Rise to a

Third-Party Personal Injury Action in Civil Court, the Attorney's Fees of the Civil
Parties' Attorneys are not Regulated or Fixed by the Commission.
Attorneys who litigate a third-party personal injury claim in District Court,
where there has been, is currently, or will be a workers' compensation injury
claim at the labor commission involving the same plaintiff, the same accident or
work injury, and, conceivably, even the same plaintiffs attorney, do not have their
personal injury attorney's fees regulated or fixed by the labor commission. Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-106 sets forth an employee's right to pursue a claim in civil
court against a liable third party in a workers' compensation claim. This right is
frequently exercised, and many of these so-called third-party claims are heard in
civil court. The district court maintains full jurisdiction over such proceedings and
does not require that the attorney's fees involved in the civil action be regulated
or fixed by the labor commission.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The term "third party," as quoted in various parts of the Workers'
Compensation Act, refers to any non-party to the workers' compensation
process. It is clear from the plain language of the Act, and from the actual
practice of law, that the legislature did not intend to comprehend all of the
attorney's fees in a third-party case tangentially "related" to the workers'
compensation litigation, as the trial court holds, but only those involving
attorney's fees paid on an injured worker's benefits to his attorney.
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-207 gives injured workers the right to
pursue a civil claim against an employer if that employer carries no workers'
compensation insurance. Again, it is clear from the plain language of the Act, and
from the actual practice of law, that the labor commission does not have
sweeping jurisdiction over all attorney's fees tangentially "related" to the workers'
compensation litigation.
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §34A~2-212 provides that judgments made by the
Utah Labor Commission may be docketed in the District Court for collection.
More specifically, §34A-2-212(2)(b) provides for "reasonable attorney's fees and
court costs in addition to the judgment award." One could argue that attorney's
fees in this case are allowed only because the labor commission, or the Act,
expressly grants them. However, it should be noted that the additional attorney's
fees sought to enforce a judgment in District Court would actually be awarded by
the District Court, not the labor commission. It can be argued with a straight face
that the statute does

not grant additional

attorney's fees

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but

merely
12

acknowledges the District Court's discretion to award additional fees and costs
over and above what the labor commission awarded in judgment.
C.

In Cases Where a Workers' Compensation Claim Gives Rise to a

Medicaid Lien, the Attorney's Fees of the Petitioner's Attorney Paid bv Medicaid
are not Regulated or Fixed by the Commission.
Attorneys who litigate a workers' compensation claim for an injured worker
and at the same time follow statutorily-mandated procedures to protect the
subrogation interests of Utah Medicaid by executing a collection agreement with
the Office of Recovery Services, do not have their Medicaid-paid attorney's fees
regulated or fixed by the Commission.
Utah Code Ann. §26-19-7 provides that "a [Medicaid recipient] may not file
a claim, commence an action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an injury disease, or
disability for which [Medicaid] has provided or has become obligated to provide
medical assistance without [Medicaid's] written consent." This statute also
applies to a Medicaid recipient's attorney. Further, §26-19-7(2)(c)(ii) provides that
"if the recipient's attorney enters into a written collection agreement with the
department, or includes the department's claim in the recipient's claim or action
pursuant to Subsection (4), the department shall pay attorney's fees at the rate of
33.3% of the department's total recovery and shall pay a proportionate share of
the litigation expenses directly related to the action." (Emphasis added.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In fact, §26-19-7(9) provides that a "recipient's attorney who knowingly and
intentionally fails to comply with this section is liable to the department for (a) the
amount of the department's claim or lien pursuant to Subsection (5); (b) a penalty
equal to 10% of the amount of the department's claim; and (c) attorney's fees
and litigation expenses related to recovering the department's claim." In short,
Utah Medicaid law—not the labor commission or the Workers' Compensation
Act—specifically directs payment of attorney's fees to attorneys (even workers'
compensation attorneys) who protect Medicaid's subrogation interests. In fact,
Medicaid law makes an attorney liable for the lien amount, penalties, and
attorney's fees and costs to collect the funds from the attorney if he does not
comply. Certainly, it cannot be argued that the labor commission "regulates and
fixes" the fees of the workers' compensation attorney in this scenario.
D.

In Cases Where a Workers' Compensation Claim Gives Rise to a

Subrogation Lien by a Health Insurance Carrier or a Medical Care Provider, the
Attorney's Fees of the Petitioner's Attorney Paid by the Insurer or Provider are
not Regulated or Fixed by the Commission.
Attorneys who litigate a workers' compensation claim for an injured worker
and at the same time agree to protect the subrogation interests of the injured
worker's health insurer or medical care provider by mutual agreement, do not
have attorney's fees that are paid by the health insurer or medical-care provider
regulated or fixed by the Commission. It is an almost-ubiquitous practice among
personal

injury, workers' compensation, and other

similarly-remunerated
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attorneys to negotiate privately with a health insurer or a medical care provider
for a reduction in its subrogation lien in exchange and as payment for the
plaintiff's attorney protecting the party's interest in the settlement or judgment. All
this is done without the labor commission regulating or fixing the fees of the
attorney. The appellant Law Firm has done so numerous times itself in the
course of business over the years, as have most, if not all, of its sister firms in the
personal injury legal fraternity. Indeed, an award of additional attorney's fees
over and above what the labor commission awards is the only incentive some
firms have to practice workers' compensation law at all, it being the only way the
firm can afford to help injured workers, get paid according to statutory attorney's
fee caps, and still remain in business.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that the decision of the Third District Court
be overturned and that the case be remanded to District Court for further
consideration of the two issues intentionally ignored at the trial court level:
Plaintiffs right to collect attorney's fees (1) under the government immunity act
as currently interpreted in case law, and (2) under the doctrines of common fund
and unjust enrichment.
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Third Judicial District
JAN 1 1 2011

&
JAN 1 0 2011
SALf LAKfc BOUNTY

»y.

—

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVIS & SANCHEZ, PLLC,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 100913499
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH UNIVERSITY
HEALTH CARE,

Judge: Deno G. Himonas

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, the law firm of Davis & Sanchez (the "Law Firm"), and defendant, University of
Utah University Health Care (the "Hospital"), brought cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in as much as the parties
presented "matters outside the pleadings," I treat the motions as having been brought for summary
judgment under Rule 56 and dispose of them accordingly. Ut. R. Civ. P. 12.
BACKGROUND
Alvaro Diaz suffered ankle and knee injuries while working for Beehive Telephone. He
received treatment for his injuries and for allegedly related complications at, among other medical
care providers, the Hospital. The cost of the treatment "totaled in excess of $550,000.00."
Complaint, \ 5 (brackets omitted); see also Amended Answer, \ 5.
Mr. Diaz sought disability compensation and medical benefits for his injuries in an action
before the Utah Labor Commission styled Alvaro Diaz v. Beehive Telephone and/or Workers
Compensation Fund, case no. 08-0020. The Law Firm represented him in this action. The Law Finn

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Deputy filew

also sought, but did not receive, consent to represent the Hospital's interests in the action before the
Labor Commission.
The parties in the workers' compensation action, through mediation, were able to come to
a compromise. As part of the compromise, the Workers' Compensation Fund, on behalf of Beehive
Telephone, agreed to reimburse the medical care providers for certain medical expenses incurred in
treating Mr. Diaz. More specifically, the Law Firm alleges that "[a]s a direct result of [its] efforts
in mediation, the [Hospital] has been paid to date approximately $347,000.00 by the [Workers'
Compensation Fund] for Alvaro Diaz's medical bills." Complaint, If 7; see also Amended Answer,

117.
Based on this recovery, the Law Firm seeks from the Hospital cc[p]ayment of a 33%
attorney's fee, or $114,551.00, on [the] approximately $347,000.00 already collected on behalf of
the [the Hospital] due to [the Law Firm's] efforts." Complaint, p. 3. The theory behind the
Complaint, while not altogether clear, appears to be that the Law Firm is entitled to attorney fees
under the "common fund" doctrine in order to prevent the Hospital's unjust enrichment. See
Complaint,'^[2.
ANALYSIS

The Hospital has advanced three independent reasons for summary adjudicatior^First^pie
Hospital argues that it is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-7-101, et seq. (^ecradTi) argues that the Law Firm "has not pled sufficient facts to
invoke the common fund doctrine." Def s mem. re judgment on the pleadings, p. 5 (capitalization
omitted). AntftodTV argues that "the Labor Commission has been delegated the exclusive

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

authority by the legislature to award attorney's fees in worker's [sic] compensation cases." Id, p.
6 (capitalization omitted).
The third argument, which is essntially an argument that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, is dispositive. Therefore, I decline to address the governmental immunity and common
fund arguments.1
The "primary objective" of Utah's courts in "interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislature's intent. To discern legislative intent, we lookfirstto the statute's plain language." State
v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, fl 12, 240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
doing so, "we read the plain language of a statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Id., (internal quotation marks, brackets,
and citations omitted).
It is apparent from the plain language of Utah's Labor Commission and Workers'
Compensation Acts (Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1 -101, etseq and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, etseq,
respectively)2 that the legislature intended that the Labor Commission determine the award of
attorney fees attendant to a workers' compensation action. Section 34A-1-301 provides that the
"commission has the duty and full powerJurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply

*A court must first satisfy itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction. It should conclude its
inquiry when it determines that jurisdiction is lacking. See Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, \
16, 184P.3d578.
2

The legislature amended both Acts in 2008 and 2009. Because neither party has addressed the
differences between the provisions previously in place and those currently in place, and because the
changes do not appear to impact my analysis, I quote from the current version of the code.
3
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the law in this chapter [34A-1] or any other title or chapter it administers," including the Workers'
Compensation Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103(1).3
The power and jurisdiction of the Labor Commission encompasses the determination of
"whether medical, nurse, or hospital services" are compensable under the Workers' Compensation
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-409(l 1). Indeed, except for circumstances not present here, a health
care provider "may not maintain a cause of action in any forum within this state other than the
[Commission for collection" of the health-related goods and services that are compensable under
the Workers'Compensation Act. Id
The power and jurisdiction of the Commission further extends to the determination of
attorney fees:

"In a case before the [Commission in which an attorney is employed, the

[Commission has the foil power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney." Utah Code Ann. §
34A-1-309(1). Notably, this power extends to the ability to "award reasonable attorney fees on a
contingency basis for medical benefits ordered paid

" Id, § 34A-l-309(4).4

The Law Firm contends that, despite this statutory language, the district court has
jurisdiction, (1) under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-501),
and (2) because neither the Workers' Compensation Act nor the regulations promulgated thereunder
"address . . . [or] regulate the attorney's fees . . . paid by any party other than the injured worker."
Pltf s mem. re judgment on the pleadings, pp. 7-8, Both arguments fail.

3

The Utah Supreme Court has declared that this "jurisdiction" is exclusive with respect to "cases
that fall within the purview of the Workers' Compensation Act." Sheppick v. Albertson 's, Inc., 922 P.2d
769,773 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
4

The Commission's power to award contingency fees based on an award of such medical benefits
is not, however, unfettered. Utah Code Ann., § 34A-l-309(4).
4
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As to the first argument, the Law Firm contends that "[t]he district courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over any action brought under... [the Governmental Immunity Act].5' Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-5Q1. In making this argument, the Law Firm assumes that the Governmental
Immunity Act applies to its claim for attorney fees, which is plainly equitable in nature. It does not.
[I]t is well settled that there is no governmental immunity for
equitable claims. See American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan,
840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1992) ("This court long has recognized a
common law exception to governmental immunity for equitable
claims. Neither the passage of time nor the enactment of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act has eroded this exception." (Citations
omitted)).
Culberston v. Bd of County Comm 'rs of Salt Lake County, 2008 UT App 22,fl20, 177 P.3d 621.
As to the second argument, it is true that "there may be certain common law claims under
the [Workers' Compensation] Act that 'could be adjudicated only in the district court... [because]
the Commission has neither the authority nor the jurisdiction to adjudicate [such claims]." Working
RX, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Fund, et al, 2007 UT App 376, ^ 173 P.3d 853 (quoting,
Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 775-76 (some brackets in original, others added)).5 But here, and as noted
above, the Labor Commission plainly has the authority and jurisdiction to address all attorney fee
issues: "In a case before the [Commission in which an attorney is employed, the [C]ommission has
full power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-309(1) (emphasis
added).

5

In Sheppick the plaintiff sought to bring a bad refusal to bargain against his employer and his
employer's workers' compensation administrator in district court. The Supreme Court rejected this
claim, holding that the facts plaintiff alleged "failed to establish district court jurisdiction to adjudicate
such a claim." 922 P.2d at 776.
5
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This sweeping language is not limited, as the Law Firm argues, to fees paid by the injured
party. Rather, the provision comprehends all of the fees related to the workers' compensation
litigation. See Stokes v Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1998) ("On its face this provision
gave the Commission broad authority to "regulate" and "fix" attorney f e e s . . . . "). Consequently,
because the Commission has the power and jurisdiction to fix the Law Firm's fee, this court lacks
jurisdiction. See Id. at 1265 ("[T]he Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
lawfulness of attorney fees charged in cases brought before it, whether the case v/as successful or
not."); see also Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 773 ("District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that
fall within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act.") (citations omitted)
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I grant the Hospital's motion and deny the Law Firm's
motion. The case is dismissed. No further order is necessary to effectuate this decision.
DATED this / ^ y

of January, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

6
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Utah Administrative Code
Labor Commission
Title R602. Adjudication
Rule R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Claims
As in effect on March 1, 2011
R602-2-4. Attorney Fees
A. Pursuant to Section 34A-1-309, the Commission adopts the following rule to regulate and fix
reasonable fees for attorneys representing applicants in workers' compensation or occupational illness
claims.
1. This rule applies to all fees awarded after July 1, 2007.
2. Fees awarded prior to the effective date of this rule are determined according to the prior
version of this rule in effect on the date of the award.
B. Upon written agreement, when an attorney's services are limited to consultation, document
preparation, document review, or review of settlement proposals, the attorney may charge the
applicant an hourly fee of not more than $125 for time actually spent in providing such services, up to a
maximum of four hours.
1. Commission approval is not required for attorneys fees charged under this subsection B. It is
the applicant's responsibility to pay attorneys fees permitted by this subsection B.
2. In all other cases involving payment of applicants' attorneys fees which are not covered by this
subsection B., the entire amount of such attorneys fees are subject to subsection C. or D. of this rule.
C. Except for legal services compensated under subsection B. of this rule, all legal services
provided to applicants shall be compensated on a contingent fee basis.
1. For purposes of this subsection C, the following definitions and limitations apply:
a. The term "benefits" includes only death or disability compensation and interest accrued
thereon.
b. Benefits are "generated" when paid as a result of legal services rendered after Adjudication
Form 152 Appointment of Counsel form is signed by the applicant. A copy of this form must be filed
with the Commission by the applicant's attorney.
c. In no case shall an attorney collect fees calculated on more than the first 312 weeks of any and
all combinations of workers' compensation benefits.
2. Fees and costs authorized by this subsection shall be deducted from the applicant's benefits
and paid directly to the attorney on order of the Commission. A retainer in advance of a Commission
approved fee is not allowed.
3. Attorney fees for benefits generated by the attorney's services shall be computed as follows:
a. For all legal services rendered through final Commission action, the fee shall be 25% of weekly
benefits generated for Digitized
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to a maximum of $15,250.
b. For legal services rendered in prosecuting or defending an appeal before the Utah Court of
Appeals, an attorney's fee shall be awarded amounting to 30% of the benefits in dispute before the
Court of Appeals. This amount shall be added to any attorney's fee awarded under subsection C.3.a.
for benefits not in dispute before the Court of Appeals. The total amount of fees awarded under
subsection C.3.a. and this subsection C.3.b. shall not exceed $22,000;
c. For legal services rendered in prosecuting or defending an appeal before the Utah Supreme
Court, an attorney's fee shall be awarded amounting to 35% of the benefits in dispute before the
Supreme Court. This amount shall be added to any attorney's fee awarded under subsection C.3.a.
and subsection C.3.b. for benefits not in dispute before the Supreme Court. The total amount of fees
awarded under subsection C.3.a, subsection C.3.b. and this subsection C.3.C shall not exceed
$27,000.
D. The following expenses, fees and costs shall be presumed to be reasonable and necessary
and therefore reimbursable in a workers compensation claim:
1. Medical records and opinion costs;
2. Deposition transcription costs;
3. Vocational and Medical Expert Witness fees;
4. Hearing transcription costs;
5. Appellate filing fees; and
6. Appellate briefing expenses.
F. Other reasonable expenses, fees and costs may be awarded as reimbursable as the
Commission may in its discretion decides in a particular workers compensation claim.
E. In "medical only" cases in which awards of attorneys' fees are authorized by Subsection 34A-1309(4), the amount of such fees and costs shall be computed according to the provisions of
subsection C and D.
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Archive
Utah Statutes
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 19. Medical Benefits Recovery Act
Current through 2010 Legislative Session
§ 26-19-7. Notice of claim by recipient - Department response - Conditions for proceeding
- Collection agreements - Department's right to intervene - Department's interests protected Remitting funds - Disbursements - Liability and penalty for noncompliance
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, compromise, release, or
waive a claim against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for
which the department has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance, without
the department's written consent as provided in Subsection (2)(b) or (4).
(b) For purposes of Subsection (1 )(a), consent may be obtained if:
(i) a recipient who files a claim, or commences an action against a third party notifies the
department in accordance with Subsection (1)(d) within 10 days of making his claim or commencing
an action; or
(ii) an attorney, who has been retained by the recipient to file a claim, or commence an action
against a third party, notifies the department in accordance with Subsection (1)(d) of the recipient's
claim:
(A) within 30 days after being retained by the recipient for that purpose; or
(B) within 30 days from the date the attorney either knew or should have known that the recipient
received medical assistance from the department.
(c) Service of the notice of claim to the department shall be made by certified mail, personal
service, or by e-mail in accordance with Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the director of
the Office of Recovery Services.
(d) The notice of claim shall include the following information:
(i) the name of the recipient;
(ii) the recipient's Social Security number;
(iii) the recipient's date of birth;
(iv) the name of the recipient's attorney if applicable;
(v) the name or names of individuals or entities against whom the recipient is making the claim, if
known;
(vi) the name of the third party's insurance carrier, if known;
(vii) the date of the incident giving rise to the claim; and
(viii) a short statement
identifying
nature
the J.recipient's
claim.
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(2) (a) Within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the claim required in Subsection (1), the
department shall acknowledge receipt of the notice of the claim to the recipient or the recipient's
attorney and shall notify the recipient or the recipient's attorney in writing of the following:
(i) if the department has a claim or lien pursuant to Section 26-19-5 or has become obligated to
provide medical assistance; and
(ii) whether the department is denying or granting written consent in accordance with Subsection
(1)(a).
(b) The department shall provide the recipient's attorney the opportunity to enter into a collection
agreement with the department, with the recipient's consent, unless:
(i) the department, prior to the receipt of the notice of the recipient's claim pursuant to Subsection
(1), filed a written claim with the third party, the third party agreed to make payment to the department
before the date the department received notice of the recipient's claim, and the agreement is
documented in the department's record; or
(ii) there has been a failure by the recipient's attorney to comply with any provision of this section
by:
(A) failing to comply with the notice provisions of this section;
(B) failing or refusing to enter into a collection agreement;
(C) failing to comply with the terms of a collection agreement with the department; or
(D) failing to disburse funds owed to the state in accordance with this section.
(c) (i) The collection agreement shall be:
(A) consistent with this section and the attorney's obligation to represent the recipient and
represent the state's claim; and
(B) state the terms under which the interests of the department may be represented in an action
commenced by the recipient.
(ii) If the recipient's attorney enters into a written collection agreement with the department, or
includes the department's claim in the recipient's claim or action pursuant to Subsection (4), the
department shall pay attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the department's total recovery and shall
pay a proportionate share of the litigation expenses directly related to the action.
(d) The department is not required to enter into a collection agreement with the recipient's attorney
for collection of personal injury protection under Subsection 31 A-22-302(2).
(3) (a) If the department receives notice pursuant to Subsection (1), and notifies the recipient and
the recipient's attorney that the department will not enter into a collection agreement with the recipient's
attorney, the recipient may proceed with the recipient's claim or action against the third party if the
recipient excludes from the claim:
(i) any medical expenses paid by the department; or
(ii) any medical costs for which the department is obligated to provide medical assistance.
(b) When a recipient proceeds with a claim under Subsection (3)(a), the recipient shall provide
written notice to the third party of the exclusion of the department's claim for expenses under
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(4) If the department receives notice pursuant to Subsection (1), and does not respond within 30
days to the recipient or the recipient's attorney, the recipient or the recipient's attorney:
(a) may proceed with the recipient's claim or action against the third party;
(b) may include the state's claim in the recipient's claim or action; and
(c) may not negotiate, compromise, settle, or waive the department's claim without the
department's consent.
(5) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action commenced by a recipient
against a third party for the purpose of recovering medical costs for which the department has
provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance.
(6) (a) If the recipient proceeds without complying with the provisions of this section, the
department is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, settlement, or compromise rendered
or made on the claim or in the action.
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which the proceeds were
made payable all medical assistance which it has provided and retains its right to commence an
independent action against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(7) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the department pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5
and 26-19-5 collected directly by the recipient shall be remitted to the Bureau of Medical Collections
within the Office of Recovery Services no later than five business days after receipt.
(8) (a) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the department pursuant to Sections 26-194.5 and 26-19-5 collected directly by the recipient's attorney must be remitted to the Bureau of Medical
Collections within the Office of Recovery Services no later than 30 days after the funds are placed in
the attorney's trust account.
(b) The date by which the funds must be remitted to the department may be modified based on
agreement between the department and the recipient's attorney.
(c) The department's consent to another date for remittance may not be unreasonably withheld.
(d) If the funds are received by the recipient's attorney, no disbursements shall be made to the
recipient or the recipient's attorney until the department's claim has been paid.
(9) A recipient or recipient's attorney who knowingly and intentionally fails to comply with this
section is liable to the department for:
(a) the amount of the department's claim or lien pursuant to Subsection (5);
(b) a penalty equal to 10% of the amount of the department's claim; and
(c) attorney's fees and litigation expenses related to recovering the department's claim.
History. Amended by Chapter 103, 2005 General Session
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Archive
Utah Statutes
Title 34A. Utah Labor Code
Chapter 1. Labor Commission Act
Current through 2010 Legislative Session
§ 34A-1-309. Attorney fees
(1) In a case before the commission in which an attorney is employed, the commission has full
power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney.
(2) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, an attorney may file
an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication to obtain an award of attorney fees as
authorized by this section and commission rules.
(3) (a) The commission may award reasonable attorney fees on a contingency basis when there
is generated:
(i) disability or death benefits; or
(ii) interest on disability or death benefits.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier shall pay attorney fees awarded under Subsection (3)(a)
out of the award of:
(i) disability or death benefits; or
(ii) interest on disability or death benefits.
(4) (a) In addition to the attorney fees ordered under Subsection (3), the commission may award
reasonable attorney fees on a contingency basis for medical benefits ordered paid in the same
percentages for an award under Subsection (3) provided for in rule made by the commission in
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, if:
(i) medical benefits are not approved by:
(A) the employer or its insurance carrier; or
(B) the Uninsured Employer's Fund created in Section 34A-2-704 ;
(ii) after the employee employs an attorney, medical benefits are paid or ordered to be paid;
(iii) the commission's informal dispute resolution mechanisms are reasonably used by the parties
before adjudication; and
(iv) the sum of the following at issue in the adjudication of the medical benefit claim is less than
$4,000:
(A) disability or death benefits; and
(B) interest on disability or death benefits.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
(b) An employer orDigitized
its insurance
carrier shall pay attorney fees awarded unHpr Q,,hc^+;^ ,A\/~\
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4/27/2011

Casemaker - Browse

in addition to the payment of medical benefits ordered.
History. Amended by Chapter 216, 2009 General Session
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Utah Code
Title 34A Utah Labor Code
Chapter 2 Workers' Compensation Act
Section 106 Injuries or death caused by wrongfal acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or
employee of employer — Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action Notice of intention to proceed against third party — Right to maintain action not involving employee- employer
relationship — Disbursement of proceeds of recovery — Exclusive remedy.

34A-2-106. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer,
agent, or employee of employer — Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of action —
Maintenance of action - Notice of intention to proceed against third party - Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship — Disbursement of proceeds of recovery — Exclusive
remedy.
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer:
(a) the injured employee, or in case of death, the employee's dependents, may claim compensation; and
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal representative may have an action for damages
against the third person
(2) (a) If compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier:
(f) shall become trustee of the cause of action against the third party; and
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its own name or in the name of the injured employee, or the
employee's heirs or the personal representative of the deceased.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), an employer or insurance carrier may not settle and release a cause of
action of which it is a trustee under Subsection (2)(a) without the consent of the commission.
(3) (a) Before proceeding against a third party, to give a person described in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (ii) a
reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding, the injured employee or, in case of death, the
employee's heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to bring an action against the third party to:
(i) the carrier; and
(ii) any other person obligated for the compensation payments.
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, the enployee's heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier and
other person obligated for the compensation payments of any known attempt to attributefeuttto the employer,
officer, agent, or employee of the employer:
(i) by way of settlement; or
(ii) in a proceeding brought by the injured employee, or, in case of death, the employee's heirs.
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding Section 34A-2-103, the injured employee or the
employee's heirs or personal representative may also maintain an action for damages against any of the following
persons who do not occupy an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased employee at the
time of the employee's injury or death:
(a) a subcontractor;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(b) a general contractor;
(c) an independent contractor;
(d) a property owner; or
(e) a lessee or assignee of a property owner.
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5)
(a) through (c).
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorney fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to
the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of death,
by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs
and attorney fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows:
(i) without reduction based onfeultattributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in
the action against the third party if the combined percentage offeultattributed to persons immune from suit is
determined to be less than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78B-5-819(2); or
(H) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the third party if the combined percentage of fault
attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 788-5-819(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied
to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
(6) The apportionment of fault to the employer in a civil action against a third party is not an action at law and
does not impose any liability on the employer. The apportionment of fault does not alter or diminish the
excbsiveness of the remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or personal representatives, or the immunity
provided employers pursuant to Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102 for injuries sustained by an employee,
whether resulting in death or not. Any court in which a civil action is pending shall issue a partial summary
judgment to an employer with respect to the employer's immunity as provided in Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3102, even though the conduct of the employer maybe considered in allocating fault to the employer in a third
party action in the manner provided in Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code
Title 34 A Utah Labor Code
Chapter 2 Workers1 Compensation Act
Section 207 Noncompliance — Civil action by employees.

34A-2-207. Noncompliance - Civil action by employees.
(1) (a) Employers who fail to comply with Section 34 A-2-2 01 are not entitled to the benefits of this chapter
or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of
employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers,
agents, or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives of such employees when death
results from such injuries.
(b) In any action described in Subsection (l)(a), the defendant may not avail himself of any of the following
defenses:
(i) the fellow-servant rule;
(h) assumption of risk; or
(iii) contributory negligence.
(2) Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and the
burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in the injury.
(3) An employer who fails to comply with Section 34A-2-201 is subject to Sections 34A-2-208 and 34A-2212.
(4) In any civil action permitted under this section against the employer, the employee shall be entitled to
necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the employer.
Amended by Chapter 13, 1998 General Session
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Utah Code
Title 34A Utah Labor Code
Chapter 2 Workers' Compensation Act
Section 212 Docketing awards in district court -- Enforcing judgment

34A-2-212. Docketing awards in district court - Enforcing judgment.
(1) (a) An abstract of anyfinalorder providing an award may befiledunder this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, in the office of the clerk of the district court of any county in the state.
(b) The abstract shall be docketed in the judgment docket of the district court where the abstract isfiled.The
time of the recent of the abstract shall be noted on the abstract by the clerk of the district court and entered in
the docket.
(c) Whenfiledand docketed under Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the order shall constitute a Kenfromthe time
of the docketing upon the real property of the employer situated in the county, for a period of eight years from
the date of the order unless the award provided in thefinalorder is satisfied during the eight-year period.
(d) Execution may be issued on the lien within the same time and in the same manner and with the same effect
as if said award were a judgment of the district court.
(2) (a) If the employer was uninsured at the time of the injury, the county attorney for the county in which the
applicant or the employer resides, depending on the district in which thefinalorder is docketed, shall enforce the
judgment when requested by the commission or division on behalf of the commission.
(b) In an action to enforce an order docketed under Subsection (1), reasonable attorney's fees and court
costs shall be allowed in addition to the award.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
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